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<v Instructor>In this lesson,</v>
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we're going to talk about risk calculations.
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Now, there are two very popular ways
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of performing risk calculations.
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These are known as quantitative and qualitative
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risk calculations.
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Let's start out with quantitative risk calculations.
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Now, a quantitative risk calculation is a method
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of risk assessment that uses mathematical
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and statistical techniques to assign numerical values
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to the likelihood and impact of potential threats.
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This involves calculating the probability
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of a specific threat that's going to occur
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as well as the magnitude of the impact
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if that threat was to materialize.
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Our result of this calculation is going to be
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a numerical representation of the risk associated
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with a particular threat.
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Now, quantitative risk calculation is really
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just a simple formula.
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Risk equals probability times impact.
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Now, the probability
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of a threat occurring is usually going to be expressed
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as a percentage, for example, 50% or 90%
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or you could write this as a decimal
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like 0.5 for 50% or 0.9 for 90%.
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Let's take the example of 50%.
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Now, if you have a probability of 50%
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this means the likelihood
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of that threat occurring is just as likely to happen
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as it is not to happen.
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Basically, it's just a coin toss.
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Now, on the other hand, if your probability is 90%
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this means that the likelihood
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of that thing happening is nine times as likely
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as that thing not happening.
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So if we see a higher probability, like 90%
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it is something we probably need to protect ourselves
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against because it's very likely
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that that threat is going to materialize.
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Now, the second part of our formula involves the impact.
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The impact is typically measured
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in terms of the financial loss
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or damage that would result if the threat was materialized.
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Basically, how bad or how severe is this threat going to be
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if it actually happens?
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Now in the physical world, let's say I have
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a small bomb that's going to detonate in my backyard
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like a firecracker, that would have a very low impact,
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but if I exploded a large bomb, it might take
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down my entire house or maybe even my neighbor's houses too.
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So it would have a really large impact.
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In the cyber world, we might look at two threats
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such as one where somebody's able to access
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one of our testing servers and download a video
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from a file containing a lesson
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from a retired certification exam, like the first version
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of the CySA+ exam.
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If that happened, it would be a pretty low impact
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to us because that exam is no longer offered
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and that video is really old and out of date
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and we've refiled it several times since then.
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On the other hand, if we had somebody who was able to hack
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into our production servers and download our entire database
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of student names and emails
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that would have a much larger impact for our company
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and so it would have a higher value
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for this impact equation in terms of the potential risk.
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Now, if we go back to our formula for risk, we said
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that risk equals probability times impact, and so we can see
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that we can multiply these two values together
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to calculate the overall risk
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using this mathematical formula.
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Now, this type of quantitative risk calculation
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is really useful for an organization
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because it allows us to better prioritize our risk
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management efforts by identifying which risks
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are considered the most likely to happen
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and have the greatest potential impact
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against our organization.
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Additionally, it provides a clear and objective way
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for us to communicate risk up to our stakeholders
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and to make data-driven decisions about risk management.
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Now, some other quantitative risk calculations
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we're going to use are things like our single loss expectancy
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and annual loss expectancy for a given asset
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such as a server, a system,
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or the entire enterprise network.
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Now, a single loss expectancy, which is written as SLE
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is a metric that's used in quantitative risk
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calculations to determine the expected financial loss
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from a single event.
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It's going to be calculated
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by multiplying the asset value by the exposure factor
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and then we represent all of this using the formula.
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SLE equals AV for asset value times EF for exposure factor.
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Now, the asset value or AV is going to be the monetary value
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of the asset that is at risk
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and the exposure factor or EF is a percentage
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of loss that would result from a specific threat.
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Now, let's say for example
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an organization has an asset valued
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at a hundred thousand dollars
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and the exposure factor for a particular threat is 10%
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then our SLE would be $10,000 because $100,000
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times 10% or 0.10 is going to equal 10,000.
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This means that if the threat actually occurs
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the organization can expect to lose $10,000.
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Now, people often ask me
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how do we calculate the exposure factor
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for this SLE equation?
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Well, the exposure factor or EF is really the amount
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of the assets value that'll be lost for a specific threat.
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So let me give you a couple
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of examples of this to help solidify this concept.
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Let's pretend
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that I just built a new web application that runs
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across a clustered server with 10 servers.
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If I was calculating the exposure factor
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for that server cluster
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and two of the 10 servers were unusable
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because of a ransomware attack
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then I now have eight out of 10 servers that remain usable
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and this gives me an exposure factor
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of 20% because two unusable servers divided
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by 10 total servers is 20% or 0.2 for my exposure factor.
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Or let's pretend I have an office building
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and I have 20 offices inside of it,
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but we had a pipe burst and it flooded one
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of those offices, and now that's unusable.
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This means I now have 19
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of the 20 offices that are still available
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for people to use.
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So I have one unusable office divided by 20 total offices
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and this gives me 5% or 0.05 as my exposure factor.
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Now, this single loss expectancy is a really important
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metric for us to consider
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because it allows our organizations
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to determine the expected loss from a single event
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and then prioritize our risk management efforts.
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This single loss expectancy can also be used
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to help establish the cost benefit
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of different risk management strategies
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and it can help us to develop a budget
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for risk management overall inside of our organization.
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Now, the single loss expectancy is really useful
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in understanding the expected cost of a single event
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or threat that's being realized, but it doesn't account
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for the likelihood of multiple events occurring.
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To understand the annual cost of a given threat though
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we need to instead calculate the annual rate
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of occurrence known as the ARO
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and the annualized lost expectancy known as the ALE.
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Now, the annual rate of occurrence
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or ARO is the number of times
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per year that a specific threat is expected to occur.
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The easiest way to calculate this number
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is to simply count the number of times
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that that thing happened in a given year.
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For example, if I'm calculating the ARO for data breaches
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I might look at the organization's history
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and see that they had three breaches in the last 12 months.
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So their ARO or annual rate of occurrence is three,
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because they had three breaches in one year.
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But what if something happens less frequently?
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Well, then you're going to have to get a number less than one
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and you really can't simply count them
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up during a single year.
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So instead, we need to calculate the ARO
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by counting the number of occurrences of a threat
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in a given period of time and then dividing it
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by the total number of years in that period.
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So our basic formula for the annual rate of occurrence
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is the number of times the threat occurred divided
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by the number of years in the period that we counted.
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For example, if a threat occurs one time every three years
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the annual rate of occurrence would be one divided by three
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or one third, which equals 0.33 occurrences per year.
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Now that we have our SLE and our ARO
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we can now calculate the annual loss expectancy
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or the ALE.
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Now, the annual loss expectancy is the expected
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financial loss from multiple events during a year.
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The annual loss expectancy is calculated
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by multiplying the single loss expectancy
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by the annual rate of occurrence, and the formula
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for this is ALE equals SLE times ARO.
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For example,
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if an organization has a single loss expectancy of $10,000
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an annual rate of occurrence of 0.33 occurrences per year
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the annual loss expectancy is going to be $3,333.33
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because I have $10,000 times one third
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or 0.33 occurrences per year
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and this gives me $3,333.33.
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Which is what the organization can expect to lose each year
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due to that specific threat.
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Now as I'm doing my risk management
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and trying to mitigate that risk, I'm going to look
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at this and then decide is it worth protecting
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against this particular risk?
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For example, let's say you called me up and said, Jason
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I'm a cybersecurity analyst, and I can mitigate that risk
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for you 100% and it'll only cost you $25,000 per year.
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I would say no thank you because I don't want to spend $25,000
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per year to solve a risk that is only costing me
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$3,333.33 per year.
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In fact, I can have this risk occur seven times more often
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and it would still be cheaper
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for me to simply allow that event to occur
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than to pay you to protect me against it.
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Now, on the other hand, if you had a security
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as a service solution that would only cost me
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a hundred dollars per month, I would probably buy it
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because a hundred dollars a month is only $1,200 per year
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and that's almost one third the cost
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of the annual loss expectancy that I calculated
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for this given threat of $3,333.33
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so it would make good business sense for me to mitigate this
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and solve the underlying risk by paying you $1,200 per year.
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You see how easy it is to make decisions when
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you have a quantitative risk calculation
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for the annual loss expectancy, and this is why
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most executives really love using quantitative
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risk analysis when they're making their business decisions.
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By having your metrics for SLE, ARO and ALE in hand
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you can have a more comprehensive view
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of the risk you're going to be taking into account as well
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as the likelihood of multiple events occurring
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over a given period of time, and then compare all that
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against the cost to remediate those risks.
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Sometimes though, you simply can't put a number
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on the risk you're looking at
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because you don't know all the costs
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or the potential liability behind a particular threat
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and when this happens, you're going to have to
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utilize a qualitative risk calculation instead.
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Now, a qualitative risk calculation is a method
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of risk assessment that uses subjective judgment
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and expert opinions to evaluate the likelihood
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and impact of potential threats.
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It doesn't rely on mathematics
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or statistical techniques to assign numerical values
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to the likelihood and impact of the threats
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like we did with a quantitative risk calculation.
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Instead, we're going to use a more flexible
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and subjective approach to assess our risk.
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In a qualitative risk calculation,
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experts in the field such as a cybersecurity analyst
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or cybersecurity engineer are going to use their knowledge
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and experience to evaluate the likelihood
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and impact of potential threats.
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They may then use a variety
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of methods to gather information about the risks
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such as brainstorming, interviews or focus group sessions.
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Now, once that information is gathered
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the experts will then use their judgment
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and expertise to assign a qualitative rating to that risk.
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This rating can be based on factors such as the likelihood
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and impact and can be described using terms
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such as high, medium, and low.
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Qualitative risk calculations are really useful
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because it allows organizations to evaluate risk
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even when there is limited data available.
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It can also provide valuable insight into new
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and emerging risks that may not have been seen before.
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Additionally, it can be useful
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for organizations with limited resources too
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because it generally requires less time and effort
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than doing a full mathematical based quantitative
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risk calculations.
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Now, most of the time
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if you're using a qualitative risk analysis
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you'll generate a simple three by three
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or four by four chart,
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and along one axis you'll plot the likelihood
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and along the other you'll plot the impact.
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Usually, if you're using a three by three matrix
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you'll use low, medium, and high.
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But if you're using a four by four matrix
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you'll use low, medium, high, and critical
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and your organization can use whatever terms they want
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but those are the most common ones that we see in the field.
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Now, let's say for example
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I had something that's a low impact
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and a low probability,
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overall we're going to rate this as a low and mark it is green.
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287

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Now, if I have something with a high impact
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and a low probability, I would rate this overall
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as a medium risk and then mark it yellow.
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290

00:11:52,650  -->  00:11:54,177
Now, if I have something that has a high impact
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291

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and a high probability, I'm going to rate this
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292

00:11:56,460  -->  00:11:59,280
as an overall high risk and mark it red.
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293

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For this reason, a lot of people call these stoplight charts
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because the overall result we're looking it
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is either green, yellow, or red for each identified risk.
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296

00:12:07,860  -->  00:12:09,720
Now, there are several reasons why qualitative
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risk calculations are sometimes preferred
298

298

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over quantitative risk calculations
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299

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inside the cybersecurity industry.
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This includes reasons like complexity, unknowns,
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00:12:18,390  -->  00:12:21,720
limited data, resource constraints, and communication.
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First, we have complexity.
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Cybersecurity threats are often highly complex
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and may be difficult to quantify using mathematical
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00:12:28,590  -->  00:12:30,240
and statistical techniques.
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00:12:30,240  -->  00:12:32,970
Because of this, qualitative risk calculations do allow
307

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00:12:32,970  -->  00:12:33,930
for a more subjective
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00:12:33,930  -->  00:12:37,320
and flexible approach to evaluating these types of risks.
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Now, second, we have unknowns.
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In cybersecurity there are a lot of threats
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that are constantly evolving and there's new threats
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00:12:43,080  -->  00:12:45,810
in zero-days that are emerging all the time.
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Quantitative risk calculation relies on historical data
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00:12:48,660  -->  00:12:49,710
which may not be available
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00:12:49,710  -->  00:12:51,690
for these new and emerging threats.
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Therefore, qualitative risk calculations will allow
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00:12:54,240  -->  00:12:55,860
for the inclusion of expert opinions
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318

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and subjective judgment, which can provide valuable insight
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00:12:58,500  -->  00:13:01,710
into the likelihood and impact of these new threats.
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Number three, we have limited data.
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321

00:13:03,930  -->  00:13:06,360
In some cases, there may be limited data available
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00:13:06,360  -->  00:13:09,000
to support a quantitative risk calculation.
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323

00:13:09,000  -->  00:13:11,010
For example, there's a new threat that has never
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00:13:11,010  -->  00:13:12,924
been seen before and there's no historical data
325

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00:13:12,924  -->  00:13:14,940
for us to use for the analysis.
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00:13:14,940  -->  00:13:15,773
Because of this,
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we can still use a qualitative risk calculation
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328

00:13:18,060  -->  00:13:19,860
by using our experts and our knowledge
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and judgment instead of relying on that historical data.
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330

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Fourth, resource constraints.
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331

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Quantitative risk calculations can be really time consuming
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and resource intensive.
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Now, it's really easy with the formulas,
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but you have to get what is that exposure factor?
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335

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What is that asset value?
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336

00:13:35,460  -->  00:13:36,720
How many times did this thing happen
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337

00:13:36,720  -->  00:13:38,970
over the last year or five years or 10 years?
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338

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And all of that can take a lot of time.
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339

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So by doing a qualitative risk calculation instead
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we can generally have a less complex method
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341

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and it can be performed more quickly
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342

00:13:48,090  -->  00:13:49,680
and it makes it very well suited
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343

00:13:49,680  -->  00:13:52,230
for organizations with limited resources.
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And the fifth reason is communication.
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Qualitative risk calculations often use natural
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346

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language instead of monetary values in math.
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347

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This makes it a lot easier to understand for non-experts
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348

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and this can help communicate the risk
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349

00:14:03,660  -->  00:14:06,000
over to senior decision makers if they're not
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350

00:14:06,000  -->  00:14:08,670
very technically minded or financially minded.
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Now, it is worth noting
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352

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that qualitative risk calculations may not be as accurate
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353

00:14:12,750  -->  00:14:15,600
as a quantitative risk calculation, and it's not
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354

00:14:15,600  -->  00:14:19,320
recommended to solely rely on qualitative risk calculations.
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355

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Most often I see a hybrid approach being used
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356

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where both qualitative and quantitative risk calculations
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357

00:14:24,930  -->  00:14:27,660
are being used together to provide a more comprehensive view
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358

00:14:27,660  -->  00:14:30,330
of all the risks facing an organization.
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359

00:14:30,330  -->  00:14:31,980
This semi quantitative method
360

360

00:14:31,980  -->  00:14:34,470
or what I like to call a hybrid risk analysis
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361

00:14:34,470  -->  00:14:35,700
is really going to use a mixture
362

362

00:14:35,700  -->  00:14:37,650
of concrete values with the opinions
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363

00:14:37,650  -->  00:14:41,160
and reasoning to measure the likelihood and impact of risk.
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364

00:14:41,160  -->  00:14:43,170
Now, this method is used a lot to try
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365

00:14:43,170  -->  00:14:45,450
to measure things that you can't measure necessarily
366

366

00:14:45,450  -->  00:14:48,150
very easily when you're dealing with dollars and cents.
367

367

00:14:48,150  -->  00:14:50,790
And so you can't do a full quantitative method,
368

368

00:14:50,790  -->  00:14:53,190
but you may have some data that you can use
369

369

00:14:53,190  -->  00:14:55,320
that can give you at least a baseline or a feeling
370

370

00:14:55,320  -->  00:14:57,810
about the dollars and cents that you're talking about.
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371

00:14:57,810  -->  00:14:59,670
Let me give you a couple of examples.
372

372

00:14:59,670  -->  00:15:01,680
Let's say, for example, you want to calculate
373

373

00:15:01,680  -->  00:15:03,630
how much employee morale is worth
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374

00:15:03,630  -->  00:15:05,610
in your company in dollars.
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375

00:15:05,610  -->  00:15:07,655
Now, honestly, that's a really hard thing to answer
376

376

00:15:07,655  -->  00:15:11,100
because there really is no definitive way to quantify
377

377

00:15:11,100  -->  00:15:13,020
in dollars employee morale.
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378

00:15:13,020  -->  00:15:14,550
But you may be able to start thinking
379

379

00:15:14,550  -->  00:15:16,710
of some things like linking employee morale
380

380

00:15:16,710  -->  00:15:17,880
to your productivity and saying,
381

381

00:15:17,880  -->  00:15:21,060
well if the morale is high, I see that people work harder
382

382

00:15:21,060  -->  00:15:23,910
and they work longer, and that makes our company more money.
383

383

00:15:23,910  -->  00:15:26,460
Or if they have low morale, they're working less
384

384

00:15:26,460  -->  00:15:27,690
and they don't do as much work for us
385

385

00:15:27,690  -->  00:15:29,580
and it costs us more money to get the same
386

386

00:15:29,580  -->  00:15:31,620
work, product out to our customers.
387

387

00:15:31,620  -->  00:15:33,570
And so you might be able to start putting a couple
388

388

00:15:33,570  -->  00:15:35,340
of dollars and cents numbers to it
389

389

00:15:35,340  -->  00:15:37,530
but it's not going to be really easy.
390

390

00:15:37,530  -->  00:15:39,360
It's not like I can definitively say,
391

391

00:15:39,360  -->  00:15:42,150
well if I have just one more point of employee morale
392

392

00:15:42,150  -->  00:15:44,790
that's going to save me a thousand dollars in labor costs.
393

393

00:15:44,790  -->  00:15:46,350
So employee morale in dollars
394

394

00:15:46,350  -->  00:15:48,900
and cents is not going to be really easy for us to calculate
395

395

00:15:48,900  -->  00:15:50,280
and instead we're going to have to use more
396

396

00:15:50,280  -->  00:15:53,700
of this hybrid or semi quantitative method to calculate it.
397

397

00:15:53,700  -->  00:15:55,320
Now, another good example might be
398

398

00:15:55,320  -->  00:15:56,880
your company's reputation.
399

399

00:15:56,880  -->  00:15:59,910
How much is your company's reputation worth in dollars?
400

400

00:15:59,910  -->  00:16:01,530
Again, this is a hard one
401

401

00:16:01,530  -->  00:16:03,510
because it takes years to build a reputation
402

402

00:16:03,510  -->  00:16:05,250
and only moments to destroy it.
403

403

00:16:05,250  -->  00:16:07,260
I'm sure if I pressed you really hard
404

404

00:16:07,260  -->  00:16:09,000
you could assign a dollar figure to it,
405

405

00:16:09,000  -->  00:16:11,460
but there'd be some kind of squishiness to it
406

406

00:16:11,460  -->  00:16:14,730
because it's really a best guess and not an exact science.
407

407

00:16:14,730  -->  00:16:16,350
You might look at some historical values
408

408

00:16:16,350  -->  00:16:18,450
like another company who suffered a data breach
409

409

00:16:18,450  -->  00:16:20,340
and how their stock prices reacted to it
410

410

00:16:20,340  -->  00:16:23,700
or if their sales went down afterwards or other factors
411

411

00:16:23,700  -->  00:16:24,690
and that way you can get an idea
412

412

00:16:24,690  -->  00:16:26,790
of how much their reputation was worth.
413

413

00:16:26,790  -->  00:16:28,800
But to identify exactly a number
414

414

00:16:28,800  -->  00:16:31,800
for your own company is still going to be really hard to do
415

415

00:16:31,800  -->  00:16:33,630
before an incident occurs.
416

416

00:16:33,630  -->  00:16:36,060
It really is a lot easier to measure the aftermath
417

417

00:16:36,060  -->  00:16:38,490
of a data breach because you can add up all your costs
418

418

00:16:38,490  -->  00:16:41,340
and operational losses to calculate an exact figure
419

419

00:16:41,340  -->  00:16:44,670
and that could represent some of this reputational harm.
420

420

00:16:44,670  -->  00:16:46,710
Let me give you one final example to show you how
421

421

00:16:46,710  -->  00:16:48,270
difficult this can be.
422

422

00:16:48,270  -->  00:16:49,530
What if I asked you how much
423

423

00:16:49,530  -->  00:16:51,240
of a cost if your network was down
424

424

00:16:51,240  -->  00:16:55,230
between 2:00 AM and 4:00 AM on July 22nd next year?
425

425

00:16:55,230  -->  00:16:57,270
Now, this is a really specific question
426

426

00:16:57,270  -->  00:16:59,670
and you could probably go back and pull the historical data
427

427

00:16:59,670  -->  00:17:02,823
from July 22nd for the last 10 years and maybe do some kind
428

428

00:17:02,823  -->  00:17:05,580
of quantitative analysis where you can start looking
429

429

00:17:05,580  -->  00:17:06,450
at all those numbers
430

430

00:17:06,450  -->  00:17:08,321
and try to get something that looks right
431

431

00:17:08,321  -->  00:17:10,470
but it's probably a lot easier
432

432

00:17:10,470  -->  00:17:12,660
for you to look at it in a qualitative manner
433

433

00:17:12,660  -->  00:17:14,370
and start thinking about it like this.
434

434

00:17:14,370  -->  00:17:18,180
Hmm, my company only works from 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM each day.
435

435

00:17:18,180  -->  00:17:20,780
So if we have a network outage between 2:00 AM
436

436

00:17:20,780  -->  00:17:24,120
and 4:00 AM it's probably not a big deal for this company.
437

437

00:17:24,120  -->  00:17:27,030
But if we had one between 2:00 PM and 4:00 PM
438

438

00:17:27,030  -->  00:17:28,860
that would actually be a bigger deal for us
439

439

00:17:28,860  -->  00:17:30,510
because that's a timeframe we're expected
440

440

00:17:30,510  -->  00:17:31,920
to service our customers.
441

441

00:17:31,920  -->  00:17:34,950
So I can say that between 2:00 AM and 4:00 AM
442

442

00:17:34,950  -->  00:17:36,600
this would have a low impact
443

443

00:17:36,600  -->  00:17:38,880
and therefore overall it might be a low event
444

444

00:17:38,880  -->  00:17:41,070
for us or maybe possibly a medium event
445

445

00:17:41,070  -->  00:17:43,770
if it had a really high probability of occurring.
446

446

00:17:43,770  -->  00:17:44,700
So as you can see
447

447

00:17:44,700  -->  00:17:47,130
there are benefits to using purely quantitative methods
448

448

00:17:47,130  -->  00:17:49,320
'cause you get that dollars and cents answer.
449

449

00:17:49,320  -->  00:17:50,550
And there's also benefits in using
450

450

00:17:50,550  -->  00:17:53,130
a purely qualitative method based on reasoning
451

451

00:17:53,130  -->  00:17:54,690
expertise and judgment.
452

452

00:17:54,690  -->  00:17:57,540
Or you can use a hybrid of the two depending on the types
453

453

00:17:57,540  -->  00:17:59,970
of threats you're trying to evaluate and the amount of data
454

454

00:17:59,970  -->  00:18:02,310
or information you have at your disposal and the amount
455

455

00:18:02,310  -->  00:18:04,860
of time you have available to make that decision.
456

456

00:18:04,860  -->  00:18:06,810
It really isn't a this or that.
457

457

00:18:06,810  -->  00:18:09,300
Sometimes it's this, that and the other thing.
458

458

00:18:09,300  -->  00:18:10,590
And we can use all of these
459

459

00:18:10,590  -->  00:18:13,293
to better understand our risk in our organizations.
