1 00:00:06,420 --> 00:00:08,610 - Now, in this Lesson 19.5, 2 00:00:08,610 --> 00:00:12,573 we're gonna focus in on access control and authorization. 3 00:00:13,410 --> 00:00:16,050 Now, access control is a security process 4 00:00:16,050 --> 00:00:18,450 that enables organizations to manage, 5 00:00:18,450 --> 00:00:21,420 well, who's authorized to access data and resources 6 00:00:21,420 --> 00:00:23,283 and what they're allowed to do. 7 00:00:24,120 --> 00:00:25,680 Now, physical access control 8 00:00:25,680 --> 00:00:29,730 focuses on facilities, equipment, devices, and paper, 9 00:00:29,730 --> 00:00:32,850 where logical access control focuses on systems, 10 00:00:32,850 --> 00:00:35,523 applications, and data. 11 00:00:36,480 --> 00:00:38,940 Now, what's so interesting over the last couple of years 12 00:00:38,940 --> 00:00:42,570 is that we've really seen an access control convergence, 13 00:00:42,570 --> 00:00:44,640 a convergence of information security 14 00:00:44,640 --> 00:00:46,800 and physical security controls, 15 00:00:46,800 --> 00:00:50,100 because they really do have the same primary objective, 16 00:00:50,100 --> 00:00:54,834 which is to protect organizational assets and personnel. 17 00:00:54,834 --> 00:00:57,780 Now, often there's a a really significant overlap 18 00:00:57,780 --> 00:01:00,120 in the technologies and in controls. 19 00:01:00,120 --> 00:01:02,850 And an example would be an access card 20 00:01:02,850 --> 00:01:04,710 that's used to both enter a building 21 00:01:04,710 --> 00:01:06,930 and to log into the network. 22 00:01:06,930 --> 00:01:09,180 So there's this emerging convergence model 23 00:01:09,180 --> 00:01:10,470 that we talked about earlier on 24 00:01:10,470 --> 00:01:12,540 when we talked about physical security 25 00:01:12,540 --> 00:01:16,500 that really demands communication and coordination 26 00:01:16,500 --> 00:01:18,360 between the two disciplines. 27 00:01:18,360 --> 00:01:22,140 And in a best case scenario, the departments participate 28 00:01:22,140 --> 00:01:25,650 in the same management and reporting structure. 29 00:01:25,650 --> 00:01:28,050 So let's talk about rights and permissions. 30 00:01:28,050 --> 00:01:28,883 You know, it's interesting. 31 00:01:28,883 --> 00:01:31,350 So often, the terms rights and permissions 32 00:01:31,350 --> 00:01:35,130 are are used interchangeably, but they're not the same. 33 00:01:35,130 --> 00:01:36,390 So what is rights? 34 00:01:36,390 --> 00:01:39,630 Well, rights are entitlements granted to users 35 00:01:39,630 --> 00:01:42,120 that determine their level of control 36 00:01:42,120 --> 00:01:43,830 and access within a system. 37 00:01:43,830 --> 00:01:47,280 So for example, change system time, or create a user, 38 00:01:47,280 --> 00:01:49,203 or to be able to install software. 39 00:01:50,430 --> 00:01:53,280 Permissions are specific authorizations 40 00:01:53,280 --> 00:01:55,380 and define what a user can do 41 00:01:55,380 --> 00:01:58,740 with specific files, directories, or system resources. 42 00:01:58,740 --> 00:02:02,700 So for example, read, write, delete, modify. 43 00:02:02,700 --> 00:02:04,623 Those are all examples of permissions. 44 00:02:05,610 --> 00:02:06,960 Now, two other concepts 45 00:02:06,960 --> 00:02:09,300 that really relate to rights and permissions, 46 00:02:09,300 --> 00:02:10,620 and we've talked about both these already, 47 00:02:10,620 --> 00:02:12,150 so this should be a refresher, 48 00:02:12,150 --> 00:02:15,510 is least privilege and authorization creep. 49 00:02:15,510 --> 00:02:17,310 It's a reminder that least privilege, 50 00:02:17,310 --> 00:02:19,050 the principle of least privilege 51 00:02:19,050 --> 00:02:21,840 refers to assigning the minimal rights and permissions 52 00:02:21,840 --> 00:02:23,700 needed to accomplish a task. 53 00:02:23,700 --> 00:02:24,533 Why? 54 00:02:24,533 --> 00:02:27,750 Because we really wanna have as small footprint as possible, 55 00:02:27,750 --> 00:02:31,470 'cause we know that an exploit is going to execute 56 00:02:31,470 --> 00:02:35,580 in the security context of the locally logged in user. 57 00:02:35,580 --> 00:02:39,000 And then authorization creep is the accumulation 58 00:02:39,000 --> 00:02:41,850 of access rights and permissions over time, 59 00:02:41,850 --> 00:02:43,650 and we talked about that in an earlier lesson, 60 00:02:43,650 --> 00:02:45,360 that as we move through an organization, 61 00:02:45,360 --> 00:02:48,390 we might acquire new rights and permissions, 62 00:02:48,390 --> 00:02:50,190 but we haven't been relieved 63 00:02:50,190 --> 00:02:51,600 of our older rights and permissions. 64 00:02:51,600 --> 00:02:53,850 And sometimes for very good reasons originally, right? 65 00:02:53,850 --> 00:02:57,060 It might be because we're training our replacement 66 00:02:57,060 --> 00:02:59,490 or we're covering both jobs for a while. 67 00:02:59,490 --> 00:03:00,360 But it's important 68 00:03:00,360 --> 00:03:03,120 that we are always looking at those change requests, 69 00:03:03,120 --> 00:03:04,380 we audit those change requests, 70 00:03:04,380 --> 00:03:05,430 and say, "Wait a minute. 71 00:03:05,430 --> 00:03:06,750 They've moved on. 72 00:03:06,750 --> 00:03:08,970 They no longer need those rights and permissions," 73 00:03:08,970 --> 00:03:11,420 so that we don't end up with authorization creep. 74 00:03:12,390 --> 00:03:13,650 Another really important 75 00:03:13,650 --> 00:03:17,220 access control principle or approach 76 00:03:17,220 --> 00:03:19,923 is dual control and separation of duties. 77 00:03:19,923 --> 00:03:23,910 Now, dual control requires more than one subject or key 78 00:03:23,910 --> 00:03:26,520 to complete a specific task. 79 00:03:26,520 --> 00:03:27,600 Here's an example. 80 00:03:27,600 --> 00:03:29,760 Let's say in a bank, we wanna open the vault, 81 00:03:29,760 --> 00:03:32,730 so we need two employees to come to the vault. 82 00:03:32,730 --> 00:03:33,870 They each have a key. 83 00:03:33,870 --> 00:03:35,340 Each put their key in and turn it, right? 84 00:03:35,340 --> 00:03:37,650 They're doing the same thing, put a key in and turning it, 85 00:03:37,650 --> 00:03:39,090 or maybe it's not a physical key, 86 00:03:39,090 --> 00:03:42,270 maybe it's biometric or maybe they have to put in a code, 87 00:03:42,270 --> 00:03:44,880 but they're doing the same thing, right? 88 00:03:44,880 --> 00:03:46,620 We need two of them there, right? 89 00:03:46,620 --> 00:03:50,817 In order to complete that specific task. 90 00:03:50,817 --> 00:03:52,560 Well, separation of duties 91 00:03:52,560 --> 00:03:55,920 implies breaking a task into separate processes, 92 00:03:55,920 --> 00:03:58,440 so no one subject is in complete control 93 00:03:58,440 --> 00:04:02,190 or has overriding decision making power. 94 00:04:02,190 --> 00:04:03,810 And we talked about that one earlier, 95 00:04:03,810 --> 00:04:06,390 but let me give you the example that we shared before. 96 00:04:06,390 --> 00:04:09,630 We talked about what if my organization 97 00:04:09,630 --> 00:04:12,120 paid vendors with wire transfers? 98 00:04:12,120 --> 00:04:12,953 I wanted to make sure 99 00:04:12,953 --> 00:04:15,480 that no one was being paid fraudulently. 100 00:04:15,480 --> 00:04:17,220 Well, let's say I have user A 101 00:04:17,220 --> 00:04:19,650 who can log into the payment program 102 00:04:19,650 --> 00:04:21,510 and just set up the vendor. 103 00:04:21,510 --> 00:04:23,460 That's all they can do. 104 00:04:23,460 --> 00:04:26,850 User two, when they log in, they can't set up a new vendor. 105 00:04:26,850 --> 00:04:30,960 All they can do is set up a payment for an existing vendor. 106 00:04:30,960 --> 00:04:32,100 They can just set up the payment, 107 00:04:32,100 --> 00:04:34,440 can't create one, can't authorize it. 108 00:04:34,440 --> 00:04:35,910 User three logs in. 109 00:04:35,910 --> 00:04:38,580 They can't create a new vendor, they can't set up a payment. 110 00:04:38,580 --> 00:04:39,630 The only thing they can do 111 00:04:39,630 --> 00:04:42,270 is authorize a payment to go out the door. 112 00:04:42,270 --> 00:04:46,530 So we've separated that payment cycle into those three tasks 113 00:04:46,530 --> 00:04:49,830 of creating the vendor, creating the payment, 114 00:04:49,830 --> 00:04:51,600 and authorizing the payment 115 00:04:51,600 --> 00:04:53,310 as those separate processes 116 00:04:53,310 --> 00:04:56,160 so that no one subject is in complete control 117 00:04:56,160 --> 00:04:58,743 or has overriding decision making power. 118 00:04:59,910 --> 00:05:02,310 Now, authorization is the process 119 00:05:02,310 --> 00:05:05,523 of granting subjects access to objects. 120 00:05:06,630 --> 00:05:08,850 Subjects are active entities, right? 121 00:05:08,850 --> 00:05:11,880 They're generally in the form of a person, like you and I, 122 00:05:11,880 --> 00:05:14,940 processes or devices that cause information 123 00:05:14,940 --> 00:05:19,110 to flow among objects or change the system state. 124 00:05:19,110 --> 00:05:21,288 Objects are passive entities, 125 00:05:21,288 --> 00:05:23,460 often referred to as a resource, 126 00:05:23,460 --> 00:05:27,150 that contain or receive information or instructions. 127 00:05:27,150 --> 00:05:30,420 Now, authorization can be static, meaning it's hard-coded, 128 00:05:30,420 --> 00:05:31,620 or it can be dynamic, 129 00:05:31,620 --> 00:05:34,893 meaning that it is influenced by situational factors. 130 00:05:36,390 --> 00:05:38,580 There are six authorization models 131 00:05:38,580 --> 00:05:39,960 you need to be familiar with, 132 00:05:39,960 --> 00:05:43,620 mandatory, known as MAC, discretionary, known as DAC, 133 00:05:43,620 --> 00:05:45,600 role-based, RBAC, 134 00:05:45,600 --> 00:05:50,280 rule-based, attribute-based, ABAC, and risk-based. 135 00:05:50,280 --> 00:05:51,580 So let's go through these. 136 00:05:52,980 --> 00:05:55,290 In a mandatory access control model, 137 00:05:55,290 --> 00:05:57,840 access is based on the relationship 138 00:05:57,840 --> 00:06:00,900 between the subject's clearance and their need to know 139 00:06:00,900 --> 00:06:03,360 and the object's classification. 140 00:06:03,360 --> 00:06:05,970 So way back when, when we were talking about classification, 141 00:06:05,970 --> 00:06:07,230 we said that we classify 142 00:06:07,230 --> 00:06:09,960 either by criticality or by sensitivity 143 00:06:09,960 --> 00:06:14,280 and that we assign clearance levels to our subjects, right? 144 00:06:14,280 --> 00:06:16,050 That's a level of trust. 145 00:06:16,050 --> 00:06:19,140 So the relationship is based on the subject's clearance 146 00:06:19,140 --> 00:06:23,100 plus need to know and the object's classification level. 147 00:06:23,100 --> 00:06:26,490 So let's say someone has a secret clearance. 148 00:06:26,490 --> 00:06:29,040 That means that they could access secret data, 149 00:06:29,040 --> 00:06:31,320 but not everything that's marked secret, right? 150 00:06:31,320 --> 00:06:34,830 They also have to have a bonafide need to know. 151 00:06:34,830 --> 00:06:39,510 And DAC is the polar opposite of MAC. 152 00:06:39,510 --> 00:06:42,720 In DAC environment or a discretionary environment, 153 00:06:42,720 --> 00:06:45,660 access is determined by the data owner. 154 00:06:45,660 --> 00:06:47,490 So the data owner gets to say 155 00:06:47,490 --> 00:06:49,770 who can have rights, who can have permissions. 156 00:06:49,770 --> 00:06:51,963 Totally on the data owner. 157 00:06:54,120 --> 00:06:56,460 In role-based or RBAC, 158 00:06:56,460 --> 00:06:59,400 access is based on the subject's assigned roles. 159 00:06:59,400 --> 00:07:03,120 So subjects are put into roles and roles are given access. 160 00:07:03,120 --> 00:07:06,810 And sometimes RBAC is referred to as non-discretionary. 161 00:07:06,810 --> 00:07:08,280 Why non-discretionary? 162 00:07:08,280 --> 00:07:09,660 Well, because what happens 163 00:07:09,660 --> 00:07:14,660 is that the owner of the data or the system can say, 164 00:07:14,797 --> 00:07:19,170 "Okay, these roles can access my system or my data, 165 00:07:19,170 --> 00:07:22,350 but they don't have any say over who gets put in the roles." 166 00:07:22,350 --> 00:07:23,183 So they can say, 167 00:07:23,183 --> 00:07:25,980 "Yes, these roles can have these rights and permissions, 168 00:07:25,980 --> 00:07:29,700 but they don't get to say who is in the roles themselves." 169 00:07:29,700 --> 00:07:32,163 So based on the subject's assigned roles. 170 00:07:33,030 --> 00:07:36,840 Then rule-based is based on compliance 171 00:07:36,840 --> 00:07:38,550 with an established set of rules. 172 00:07:38,550 --> 00:07:41,070 Generally rules don't care who the subject is. 173 00:07:41,070 --> 00:07:42,177 They're just a whole set of rules, 174 00:07:42,177 --> 00:07:44,700 and the best example would be a firewall, right? 175 00:07:44,700 --> 00:07:48,090 So firewall rules are based on source IP 176 00:07:48,090 --> 00:07:51,120 and destination IP and protocol 177 00:07:51,120 --> 00:07:53,793 to have to comply with those rules. 178 00:07:55,023 --> 00:07:57,630 And we come to one that you might be less familiar with, 179 00:07:57,630 --> 00:07:59,550 which is a really interesting and emerging one 180 00:07:59,550 --> 00:08:02,880 called attribute-based access control, or ABAC. 181 00:08:02,880 --> 00:08:04,980 In ABAC, access is determined 182 00:08:04,980 --> 00:08:07,410 by a combination of attributes, 183 00:08:07,410 --> 00:08:09,810 subject attributes, object attributes, 184 00:08:09,810 --> 00:08:12,060 rules, and environmental conditions, 185 00:08:12,060 --> 00:08:14,723 and we're gonna dig right into that one in just a sec. 186 00:08:15,780 --> 00:08:17,190 And then lastly, we have risk-based, 187 00:08:17,190 --> 00:08:20,010 which is another emerging authorization model, 188 00:08:20,010 --> 00:08:23,100 and that's influenced by dynamic factors 189 00:08:23,100 --> 00:08:25,110 and contextual data analytics. 190 00:08:25,110 --> 00:08:26,910 And we're gonna look a little bit closer 191 00:08:26,910 --> 00:08:28,500 at that one as well. 192 00:08:28,500 --> 00:08:33,500 So MAC, DAC, RBAC, rule-based, ABAC, and risk-based. 193 00:08:33,810 --> 00:08:35,550 Make sure that you can identify 194 00:08:35,550 --> 00:08:37,473 all of these authorization models. 195 00:08:38,730 --> 00:08:41,790 Now, ABAC stands for attribute-based access control. 196 00:08:41,790 --> 00:08:43,830 It's a logical access control model 197 00:08:43,830 --> 00:08:47,190 that controls access to objects by evaluating rules 198 00:08:47,190 --> 00:08:51,090 against the attributes of the subject and the object 199 00:08:51,090 --> 00:08:54,453 as well as operations and the environment. 200 00:08:56,460 --> 00:08:59,730 Now, ABAC supports very complex Boolean rule sets 201 00:08:59,730 --> 00:09:03,300 that can evaluate just tons of different attributes, 202 00:09:03,300 --> 00:09:07,050 and the policies that can be implemented in an ABAC model 203 00:09:07,050 --> 00:09:09,300 are limited only by the degree imposed 204 00:09:09,300 --> 00:09:11,610 by the computational language that you're using 205 00:09:11,610 --> 00:09:14,760 and the available attributes themselves. 206 00:09:14,760 --> 00:09:17,100 Now, an example of an access control framework 207 00:09:17,100 --> 00:09:18,900 that is consistent with ABAC 208 00:09:18,900 --> 00:09:21,810 is Extensible Access Control Markup Language. 209 00:09:21,810 --> 00:09:23,490 There's that word extensible, right? 210 00:09:23,490 --> 00:09:26,130 Remember the extensible said that we can modify, 211 00:09:26,130 --> 00:09:27,930 we can freely modify something, 212 00:09:27,930 --> 00:09:30,900 but without changing sort of the the underlying basis, 213 00:09:30,900 --> 00:09:33,330 and I said that often when you see the word extensible, 214 00:09:33,330 --> 00:09:37,173 it will be abbreviated with an X, so XACML. 215 00:09:38,670 --> 00:09:41,790 So here's an illustration of ABAC. 216 00:09:41,790 --> 00:09:43,770 This illustration actually comes from a NIST, 217 00:09:43,770 --> 00:09:46,740 National Institute of Standards and Technology publication. 218 00:09:46,740 --> 00:09:50,940 It's NIST SP 800-162, all about ABAC. 219 00:09:50,940 --> 00:09:52,110 So if you wanna learn more about ABAC, 220 00:09:52,110 --> 00:09:54,150 would be a great resource for you. 221 00:09:54,150 --> 00:09:55,740 But we've got our subject 222 00:09:55,740 --> 00:09:58,230 and our subject requests access to the object, 223 00:09:58,230 --> 00:10:02,077 and so the access control mechanism says, 224 00:10:02,077 --> 00:10:04,650 "Okay, well let's look at the subject attributes, 225 00:10:04,650 --> 00:10:06,900 let's look at the object attributes, 226 00:10:06,900 --> 00:10:09,270 let's look at the environmental conditions 227 00:10:09,270 --> 00:10:12,690 and any other rules in order to compute a decision." 228 00:10:12,690 --> 00:10:15,780 And if everything is good, 229 00:10:15,780 --> 00:10:17,730 they're allowed to access that object, 230 00:10:17,730 --> 00:10:19,887 and if not, well, they won't be allowed to. 231 00:10:19,887 --> 00:10:23,610 But I think this is a really nice visual on how ABAC works, 232 00:10:23,610 --> 00:10:25,920 and again, I would encourage you to go out 233 00:10:25,920 --> 00:10:27,750 and look at the NIST publication 234 00:10:27,750 --> 00:10:29,673 if you wanna learn more about ABAC. 235 00:10:31,320 --> 00:10:33,750 So next I wanna share with you some risk triggers, 236 00:10:33,750 --> 00:10:35,340 and these are actually risk triggers 237 00:10:35,340 --> 00:10:38,100 that are from the Microsoft Cloud environment. 238 00:10:38,100 --> 00:10:40,110 Now, often, risk triggers are layered 239 00:10:40,110 --> 00:10:43,800 with another type of authorization model. 240 00:10:43,800 --> 00:10:45,990 So let's look at four risk triggers. 241 00:10:45,990 --> 00:10:49,440 Anonymous IP address, unfamiliar sign-in properties, 242 00:10:49,440 --> 00:10:53,280 atypical travel, and impossible travel. 243 00:10:53,280 --> 00:10:55,890 Anonymous IP address indicates a sign-in 244 00:10:55,890 --> 00:10:58,860 from an anonymous IP address, just like it sounds. 245 00:10:58,860 --> 00:11:02,340 Now that might be fine, but that might be suspicious, right? 246 00:11:02,340 --> 00:11:05,520 Why would you be coming in from an anonymous IP address? 247 00:11:05,520 --> 00:11:07,470 Again, it might be a legitimate reason, 248 00:11:07,470 --> 00:11:10,143 but worth exploring to get more information there. 249 00:11:11,190 --> 00:11:15,240 Unfamiliar sign-in properties consider past sign-in history 250 00:11:15,240 --> 00:11:18,150 to identify non-familiar properties. 251 00:11:18,150 --> 00:11:19,410 Now, examples of properties 252 00:11:19,410 --> 00:11:23,523 would be your operating system or your browser level. 253 00:11:25,170 --> 00:11:28,620 Now, atypical travel identifies two sign-ins 254 00:11:28,620 --> 00:11:32,040 originating from geographically distant locations 255 00:11:32,040 --> 00:11:35,160 where at least one of the locations is atypical, 256 00:11:35,160 --> 00:11:36,960 given past behavior. 257 00:11:36,960 --> 00:11:40,290 So if you normally sign in from San Francisco, 258 00:11:40,290 --> 00:11:43,350 and the next day, you're signing in from New York, 259 00:11:43,350 --> 00:11:45,270 well, that's atypical, right? 260 00:11:45,270 --> 00:11:47,040 You're usually in San Francisco. 261 00:11:47,040 --> 00:11:48,570 Now, could it be perfectly legitimate? 262 00:11:48,570 --> 00:11:50,700 Sure, you might be coming through a VPN, 263 00:11:50,700 --> 00:11:54,420 but you know, they're too geographically distant locations 264 00:11:54,420 --> 00:11:57,540 where at least one of those is atypical. 265 00:11:57,540 --> 00:12:00,330 And then we get impossible travel. 266 00:12:00,330 --> 00:12:03,540 Impossible travel identifies two user activities 267 00:12:03,540 --> 00:12:06,930 originating from geographically distant locations 268 00:12:06,930 --> 00:12:09,450 within a timeframe shorter than it would take 269 00:12:09,450 --> 00:12:12,030 to travel between the locations. 270 00:12:12,030 --> 00:12:13,950 So at noon, right? 271 00:12:13,950 --> 00:12:16,710 If I logged in from London, England, 272 00:12:16,710 --> 00:12:18,780 and you know, 10 minutes later, 273 00:12:18,780 --> 00:12:20,820 I'm logging in from Sydney, Australia, 274 00:12:20,820 --> 00:12:23,280 it's like, well, I can't get from London to Sydney 275 00:12:23,280 --> 00:12:24,570 in 10 minutes, right? 276 00:12:24,570 --> 00:12:27,570 No matter how much I might want to, I can't do that. 277 00:12:27,570 --> 00:12:29,520 That's impossible travel. 278 00:12:29,520 --> 00:12:32,730 So again, that's going to be a risk-based trigger 279 00:12:32,730 --> 00:12:35,160 to say we need to get more information. 280 00:12:35,160 --> 00:12:36,600 And could it be legit? 281 00:12:36,600 --> 00:12:40,230 Sure, it could once again be maybe a VPN, right? 282 00:12:40,230 --> 00:12:42,510 So we're showing those different IP addresses 283 00:12:42,510 --> 00:12:45,150 when in fact maybe I haven't moved at all. 284 00:12:45,150 --> 00:12:46,590 So it's not necessarily 285 00:12:46,590 --> 00:12:49,260 that it's always going to be wrong or always a stopper, 286 00:12:49,260 --> 00:12:52,143 but it is a trigger to get additional information. 287 00:12:53,700 --> 00:12:56,220 And that, my friends, brings us to a three-second challenge. 288 00:12:56,220 --> 00:12:58,230 Five challenge questions, three seconds each. 289 00:12:58,230 --> 00:12:59,970 You know how to do it. 290 00:12:59,970 --> 00:13:01,410 Accumulation of access rights, 291 00:13:01,410 --> 00:13:04,650 permissions, and privileges over time. 292 00:13:04,650 --> 00:13:06,753 One, two, three. 293 00:13:08,340 --> 00:13:10,650 That's authorization creep. 294 00:13:10,650 --> 00:13:13,740 Number two, requiring more than one subject or key 295 00:13:13,740 --> 00:13:16,260 to complete a specific task. 296 00:13:16,260 --> 00:13:17,883 One, two, three. 297 00:13:19,170 --> 00:13:20,910 That's dual control. 298 00:13:20,910 --> 00:13:23,850 That was the example I gave you of the two bank employees 299 00:13:23,850 --> 00:13:25,803 going to open up the vault. 300 00:13:27,060 --> 00:13:29,580 Number three, a minimum set of permissions 301 00:13:29,580 --> 00:13:32,310 needed to perform a task. 302 00:13:32,310 --> 00:13:33,903 One, two, three. 303 00:13:34,920 --> 00:13:36,720 And that's gonna be least privilege. 304 00:13:37,620 --> 00:13:38,730 Number four, 305 00:13:38,730 --> 00:13:42,270 access is based on the subject's assigned roles. 306 00:13:42,270 --> 00:13:43,860 This is an easy one. 307 00:13:43,860 --> 00:13:45,930 One, two, three. 308 00:13:45,930 --> 00:13:50,070 Well, that must be role-based access control or RBAC. 309 00:13:50,070 --> 00:13:52,020 And lastly number five, 310 00:13:52,020 --> 00:13:54,420 breaking a task into separate processes 311 00:13:54,420 --> 00:13:57,330 so no one subject is in complete control. 312 00:13:57,330 --> 00:14:00,570 That's the example I gave you about paying our vendors. 313 00:14:00,570 --> 00:14:02,910 One, two, three. 314 00:14:02,910 --> 00:14:04,713 And that's separation of duties. 315 00:14:05,880 --> 00:14:08,190 Well, that brings us to a security in action. 316 00:14:08,190 --> 00:14:12,270 This one's about fraudulent activity and access controls. 317 00:14:12,270 --> 00:14:14,520 The accounting department wires funds 318 00:14:14,520 --> 00:14:16,710 to suppliers all around the world, 319 00:14:16,710 --> 00:14:19,830 and it's critical that only authorized personnel 320 00:14:19,830 --> 00:14:23,520 have the authority to initiate and release a transfer. 321 00:14:23,520 --> 00:14:25,350 Now, several controls were put in place 322 00:14:25,350 --> 00:14:28,320 for the online wire transfer application, 323 00:14:28,320 --> 00:14:31,200 including IP address restrictions 324 00:14:31,200 --> 00:14:33,745 and biometric authentication. 325 00:14:33,745 --> 00:14:37,590 But much to everybody's surprise, during a financial audit, 326 00:14:37,590 --> 00:14:41,340 it was discovered that the CFO, the chief financial officer, 327 00:14:41,340 --> 00:14:44,880 had been making fraudulent wire transfers. 328 00:14:44,880 --> 00:14:46,350 So what access controls 329 00:14:46,350 --> 00:14:49,233 would have reduced the opportunity for fraud? 330 00:14:50,550 --> 00:14:52,260 I know you know this answer right away, 331 00:14:52,260 --> 00:14:55,110 but go ahead and put me on pause, jot down some notes, 332 00:14:55,110 --> 00:14:57,710 and come back, and we'll talk about access controls. 333 00:15:00,065 --> 00:15:02,520 Well, access controls that could be considered 334 00:15:02,520 --> 00:15:06,251 include dual control and separation of duties. 335 00:15:06,251 --> 00:15:08,220 Now, implementing dual control 336 00:15:08,220 --> 00:15:11,460 would require two or more employees to collude, right? 337 00:15:11,460 --> 00:15:14,760 So you'd need two employees to do the same task, 338 00:15:14,760 --> 00:15:16,590 and they would have to collude, 339 00:15:16,590 --> 00:15:18,330 which would significantly reduce 340 00:15:18,330 --> 00:15:21,483 the probability of fraudulent actions. 341 00:15:22,800 --> 00:15:25,830 Implementing separation of duties would break the task down 342 00:15:25,830 --> 00:15:28,230 into distinct processes 343 00:15:28,230 --> 00:15:31,380 so that no one subject is in complete control 344 00:15:31,380 --> 00:15:34,350 or has overriding decision making power. 345 00:15:34,350 --> 00:15:36,150 So those would really be your options, 346 00:15:36,150 --> 00:15:39,330 dual control or separation of duties. 347 00:15:39,330 --> 00:15:42,450 Now in this situation, for sure, separation of duties 348 00:15:42,450 --> 00:15:45,060 would be more operationally efficient, right? 349 00:15:45,060 --> 00:15:48,120 Dual control for major activities like this 350 00:15:48,120 --> 00:15:49,080 doesn't usually make sense, 351 00:15:49,080 --> 00:15:50,580 because then I have to have two employees 352 00:15:50,580 --> 00:15:53,820 who are effectively sitting together side by side, 353 00:15:53,820 --> 00:15:55,980 doing the same job, right? 354 00:15:55,980 --> 00:16:00,450 But by breaking the task into separate processes, 355 00:16:00,450 --> 00:16:02,190 and I can separate them out, 356 00:16:02,190 --> 00:16:04,260 two people, three people, four people, five people, 357 00:16:04,260 --> 00:16:06,180 as many people as I need. 358 00:16:06,180 --> 00:16:08,400 Much more operationally efficient, 359 00:16:08,400 --> 00:16:10,200 and the more people I have, 360 00:16:10,200 --> 00:16:12,990 the more I have reduced the probability 361 00:16:12,990 --> 00:16:15,030 of collusion and fraud. 362 00:16:15,030 --> 00:16:16,050 So in this case, 363 00:16:16,050 --> 00:16:19,290 I would probably go with separation of duties, 364 00:16:19,290 --> 00:16:20,820 but thinking through these options 365 00:16:20,820 --> 00:16:22,890 and then be able to help implement them, 366 00:16:22,890 --> 00:16:25,080 that's security in action. 367 00:16:25,080 --> 00:16:26,790 Wow, another big word cloud. 368 00:16:26,790 --> 00:16:29,730 Again, make sure that you understand all these terms 369 00:16:29,730 --> 00:16:31,860 and that you can speak to all of them, right? 370 00:16:31,860 --> 00:16:34,020 'Cause they're all fair game for the exam. 371 00:16:34,020 --> 00:16:36,150 So do that before you move on, 372 00:16:36,150 --> 00:16:37,860 and once you're comfortable and confident, 373 00:16:37,860 --> 00:16:40,413 move on to the next lesson, and I'll see you there.